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Abstract
Developing a conceptual and practical understanding of employee-employer relationships is a 
central concern to the practice and research of human resource management (HRM). HRM is 
fundamentally a people-focused activity ‘manifested in a series of investments in observed human 
behavior and perceived potential, as assessed or inferred by employers and their agents such as 
HR managers, line-managers, supervisors, project team leaders, and so on, with the objective to 
add value to organizations as they pursue strategic business objectives’ (Rowley and Jackson, 
2011). In Japan, traditional notions of employees pursuing their career within one organization 
and exchanging loyalty for a sense of employment security can be seen as a form of deal between 
individual employees, individual organizations, and the government and other public institutions. 
This paper develops an HRM perspective on the management of a specific segment in the labor 
market; namely, older workers in the context of a developed economy with a rapidly ageing society 
(Jackson and Debroux, 2016).  
The basis of the psychological contract in Japan: practice and concept
An individual’s career can be assumed to develop over time through made and received experience 
and through self-perception and through processes of self-expectation. The assumption at this initial 
stage is that human (social) relationships are formed through interaction between individuals as 
members of social groups. As Giddens states it, (1991) it can be assumed that these interactions and 
the relationships they form and nurture are bounded by space and time: they also express purpose, 
fundamental among which is physiological, psychological and sociological survival and, based on it, 
a fundamental sense of security, well-being, and optimism in response to current and in anticipation 
of future events. 
Once individual workers have been selected, they continue being selected until they are either 
de-selected, or they de-select themselves. HRM practitioners make worker selection decisions 
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on the basis of past experiences, current perceptions, and future expectations: in this sense they 
are strategic from both the employer and employee perspectives and are culture-specific in terms 
of the normative values, expectations and behaviors they elicit (Rowley and Jackson, 2011). In 
HRM practice, strategic decisions leading to staff selection and/or de-selection are influenced 
by the formal and perhaps implicitly institutionalized policies that, when made explicit, might be 
interpreted as artefacts or observable expressions of organizational or sector-based cultures. In 
Japanese contexts for HRM policy-making, such ‘common sense’ assumptions are likely to be 
communicated and ‘learnt’ only implicitly, much as the psychological contract appears ‘implied’ 
when compared against a written tangible contract of employment (Jackson, 2013). 
Other factors that contribute to influence decisions related to employees’ selection and/or 
de-selection are for example, social perceptions of what is or is not available in the labor market, 
internal and external to the organization, for a particular work function or role. In other words, 
it relates to the extent of the possibility of replacement of an individual worker. Economic factors 
also exert a key strategic influence: for example, in Japan older workers are generally considered 
‘more expensive’ than younger workers, due to the traditional wage calculations that are based on 
Lazear (1979) theory of differed wage. Similarly, regulations based on chronological age are key 
factors as shown by the pension reform that lift up the eligibility age for access to public pension. 
It determines at what age an employer might or must de-select an individual worker (Minister of 
Health, Labor and Welfare – MHLW, 2014). 
As Jackson (2013) points out the term ‘older’ workers suggests, invoking the definition of HRM 
stated here above as the strategic management of ‘assets’ or human capital, a perceived boundary 
between older and younger workers. It suggests a chronological advancement from ‘younger to 
older’, thus reinforcing notions and assessments of biological and chronological age in the wage 
system and career development schemes. However, invoking HRM contexts for managing ‘older’ as 
opposed to ‘younger’ workers might carry with it some stereotypical viewpoints from broader social 
contexts. For example, prejudices may emerge that ‘older’ workers are likely to be less productive 
than their ‘younger’ counterparts and slower to learn or be retrained. It could be argued that: ‘IT 
business is not suitable for old people’ or that ‘we need salespeople who are able to grasp the latest 
trend on the market in order to know what our customers want. In many respects older employees 
struggle to make sense of new things; it is very hard to retrain them, all the more that large 
differences exist between old workers potential and that health issues may hinder their involvement 
in projects’ (Jackson, 2013). 
Rousseau defined psychological contracts in terms of ‘individual beliefs’ that, when expressed and 
negotiated over time and across contexts for employment, inform the terms and conditions of a 
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reciprocal exchange agreement between the employee and the organization’ (Rousseau, 1995). 
Once selected for employment, and again through early stages of the employment relationship, 
new employees are assumed to receive and / or infer ‘promises’ that guide their current experience 
and future expectation of employment and career (Rousseau, 1995). These promises are filtered 
through the individual worker’s perception. Indeed, an individual worker’s assessment that 
employer-made promises are not being kept can lead to loss of trust in the relationship and thus of 
perceived contract violation or breach (Briner and Conway 2005). 
For Rousseau, psychological contracts are guided by promises, actual and or inferred - and binding 
power such promises exert. They suggest that all participating parties are bound by a set of 
reciprocal obligations when agreements are concluded, regardless of whether these agreements 
are captured visibly and tangibly in the form of a written document, or whether they are perceived 
by one or other party as being such. The employment system determines the type of relationship 
that the organization shares with its employees and negotiates with them over time. To illustrate, it 
is traditionally argued that workers in Japan who have been selected and granted an expectation of 
continued employment tend to adopt an organizational identity ahead of an individual professional 
identity (Jackson and Tomioka, 2004). The extent to which this expectations and thus psychological 
ties of contracted obligation to the company still holds true is a question addressed later on in 
this paper. There is still a debate about the extent to which the perceived need for a new kind of 
psychological contract comes as a result of employee and employers expectations of employment 
relations converging with the more transactional type of contract considered closed to what is 
considered as ‘American’ model or whether if a hybrid form of governance incorporating American 
and Japanese practices and values is emerging (Jackson and Tomioka, 2004).
The lack of a strategic vision on older workers’ employment 
Evidence suggests that Japan has been successful in social and economic terms in the management 
of older workers. Historically, policy-makers in Japan have tended to encourage through both 
incentive-driven and coercive measures the unemployed or inactive back into jobs or urge those 
in employment to delay retiring. Unemployment allowances (amount of allowance and duration of 
eligibility) are not generous compared to what is available in most Western European countries 
(Debroux 2016). The workfare policy was put in place in order to avoid a long disconnection from 
the labor market that was thought to be detrimental to the workers and to society. To some extent 
it may be said that is is attuned to the socio-cultural norms inducing Japanese people to continue 
to remain active in one capacity or another in order to contribute to society and to avoid becoming 
a burden to others, especially family and community (Martine, 2012). As claimed (Fujimura 2015) 
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on the basis of a 2008 survey commissioned by Japanese government the willingness to work 
at old age in Japan seems to be higher than in European countries. It may be argued that those 
figures must be taken cautiously because they may also reflect the relatively low level of pension in 
Japan, especially compared to the European welfare states (OECD 2014) and the still lower level of 
health and welfare support. Those elements may induce elderly people to stay on the labor market 
although they may prefer to retire completely. 
Despite this caveat it is true that older Japanese people tend to stay in the labor market in larger 
numbers and for longer time than in most European countries (ILO, 2014). It has given the 
opportunity to companies to utilize retired dedicated human resources at reasonable cost and to 
the public authorities the possibility to slow down the rising deficit of the social security system. In 
view of the demographic decline and to answer to societal need for inclusiveness of elderly people 
in society Japanese public authorities go even further in the direction of longer career through 
initiatives launched in the 2000s ‘to create a society where it will be possible to work without age 
limit’ or with the project of ‘concretization of employment up to 70’ of the Japan Organization for 
Employment of the Elderly, Persons with Disabilities and Job Seekers (JEED) in 2010 (JEED, 2010). 
Those initiatives are in line with those followed in the European Union that also aim to create a 
society that gives the opportunity to remain in the labor market without any kind of discrimination, 
including age discrimination (Yamazaki and Ide 2015). 
However, such workfare-based policy comes with complications, even paradoxes. Overall, it 
could be argued that traditional policies and practices of Japanese human resource management 
in relation to employing older workers require significant revamping under the impact of 
demographics, the socio-cultural context, the regulatory environment and the subsequent need for 
changes in the social security system. In addition to the challenges regarding labor policy, changes 
in the labor supply structure (overall reduction in the labor force on the one hand, increase of 
women and older people in the labor market on the other) urge public authorities and companies to 
consider utilizing elderly workers more efficiently and effectively as part of a new employment deal 
(Debroux, 2016). 
Japanese authorities and companies (with a number of exceptions, though) have never really 
thought until recently about policies that would favor old workers’ work in good conditions (decent 
wage, consideration of age limitation in term of working hours, mobility, scope of work). Many 
elderly workers occupy under-qualified jobs. They are also not given the opportunity to acquire new 
skills and they are not paid fairly. Other older workers occupy qualified jobs similar to those they 
were performing before retirement and are reasonably rewarded. However, it has so far reflected 
more an opportunistic behavior of the organizations, i.e., the opportunity to utilize existing skills at 
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low cost, and not a strategic policy aiming to optimize the talent of older workers. 
HRM system was never static and with the rapid progress of technology and market changes doubt 
over the relationship between productivity and age under the seniority system started to emerge 
since the 1980s. Since that time Japanese companies have had increasing dif ficulty justifying 
the wage levels of workers (especially old workers) with highly firm-specific skills. Besides the 
traditional practice of transfer to affiliated companies, they have attempted to manage a transition 
toward retirement with age curve flattening for the over 50 workers and early retirement schemes 
in order to cope with their high cost associated to seniority-based wage system (Sueki, 2013). 
This has led to claims of breaches of the psychological contract increasing rapidly from the 
1990s onwards because of wage and career stagnation, forced retirement or transfer in another 
organization offering lower working conditions than what was promised at the time of the selection 
(Martine, 2012). 
By and large management of pre-retirement senior employees over 50 was largely based on the 
premise of long-term trust and loyalty during the all post-war period. Companies are overall still 
committed nowadays to take care of the older workers in a legal environment limiting drastically 
the possibility of lay-off of permanent workers and imposing increasingly coercive measures in 
order to foster employment of older workers (Debroux, 2016). This still occurs in the framework of 
a relational-type psychological contract in an internal labor market, albeit with increasingly flexibly 
interpreted promises and the subsequent problems of breach and violation pointed out here above. 
Employees who perceive themselves ‘marketable’ in the labor market tend to welcome more and 
more clearly HRM systems that explicitly recognize individual achievement, rationalization and 
efficiency’. Furthermore, they no longer automatically ‘perceive their employers as benevolent’ and 
as a consequence ‘do not expect them to be so’ (Debroux, 2011). 
But, they still broadly expect the organization to respect its promise of long-term job guarantee up 
until mandatory retirement, to give the opportunity to enjoy welfare corporatism and to reward 
long-term commitment to the organization. Both management and workers seem to believe that 
adoption of performance-driven appraisal and reward systems is not incompatible with long-term 
commitment. Although some of them links it partly to individual performance, the very large 
majority of companies continue to pay a retirement allowance based on tenure that reward 
significantly better the workers who stay in the organization for more than 20 years (Sueki, 2013).
At the same time, though, the relatively low level of investment in training of the over 50 years old 
workers indicates that the logic of constant up-skilling of workers expected to be given increasingly 
complex types of jobs does not fully apply to the large majority of them (Debroux, 2016). 
Since 2004 companies of more than 50 employees are obliged to devise measures in order to keep 
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workers at work until 65. However, until 2013 they were allowed to re-hire the retired workers they 
wanted (Sueki 2013). As a result they were able to devise policies enabling them to take advantages 
of existing skills and experience and to keep selected older workers beyond mandatory retirement 
age at relatively low cost. For similar full-time jobs workers could be paid wages about 30-50 per 
cent lower than before retirement, which made them competitive compared to younger workers. 
This was made possible because of the characteristics of the in-work pension system but also 
of financial incentives complementing the pension of retired workers. The immense majority of 
them lose permanent status when they retire and are re-selected under contractual status offering 
lower reward and no fringe benefit (Debroux, 2016). For example, companies receive subsidies for 
offering reemployment or extended employment. Wage subsidies are also available through the 
unemployment insurance system to full-time workers aged 60-64 who earn less than 75 per cent of 
their former wages, so the take-up that is paid through the unemployment system is low (Martine, 
2012). 
So, it could be argued that mandatory retirement age for permanent employees at 60 in large 
companies combined with de facto acceptance of age discrimination, and large dif ferential of 
treatment between regular and non-regular employment, has largely contributed to explain the 
higher labor force participation rates for older workers after retirement. Some marginal elements 
of the pre-retirement relational contract are maintained so far in the sense that many companies 
often keep retired workers in jobs of ancillary nature that are not absolutely necessary for corporate 
performance. It gives the opportunity to some retired workers to complement their pension income 
before smoothly retiring for good. However, overall the psychological contract significantly changes 
of nature after retirement. Reflecting the cost-driven strategy it departs form the relational contract 
of implicitness, flexibility of the interpretation of the promises, and informality of the agreement. 
It becomes mostly of transactional nature, i.e., based on contractual clear time frame, scope of 
occupations, monetary valuation, specificity and explicitness of promise. A set number of defined 
tasks with limited commitment become the rule. The separation between pre and post retirement is 
clear-cut.
The difficulties to implement the recognized necessary changes
The current political legal, demographic and socio-economic changes force companies to 
reconsider relationships with the pre-retired and retired workers in a different light. The evolution 
cannot be separated from the relationships with the younger segments of the workforce. The legal 
obligation since 2013 to keep on payroll all workers wishing to work until they are 65 years old is 
bound to have huge implications on the manner Japanese companies manage the whole workforce. 
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The Lazear (1979) logic does not appear to be sustainable anymore in an aging society and with 
retirement at 65 without complete transformation of the existing HRM policy in regards of wage and 
career development.  Since 1998 the law forbids to set the mandatory retirement age of permanent 
employees at below 6o years old but companies are now free to keep age at 60, set an higher age 
or scrap the retirement limit all together. For the time being few companies (around 15% of listed 
companies) are shifting mandatory retirement of permanent employees from 60 to 65 (Ministry 
of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2015). However, pressure can be expected to mount in the following 
years alongside with the gradual (one more year every three years ending up to 65 years old for all 
workers by 2025) moving up of the eligibility age of the earning-related based part of the pension 
(MHLW, 2014).
Financial support is expected to remain in place to compensate somehow the income drop but, 
nevertheless, it will be increasingly difficult to have over 60 years old workers accepting to shift to 
a lower contractual status as it used to be casually the case. Without receiving any pension and with 
the quasi impossibility to increase substantially the financial incentives in view of the cost it would 
mean that in current conditions of shift to non-permanent status many of them would received only 
about 40% of their former pre-retirement income (Nabeta, 2016). Most of them would be unable to 
keep decent standards of living and could end up as old working poor. In the current environment 
pushing for end of discrimination in the labor market in asking for respect of ‘equal salary for equal 
work’ the pursuit of the traditional policy is politically unpalatable.  
The high number of concerned older workers means that companies have to think about a more 
drastic revamping of the entire wage curves and career development schemes for all segments 
of the workforce in anticipation of the future changes. It means that they have to reconsider the 
contribution of older workers in a more dynamic perspective (Sueki, 2013). Concretely, it means 
that they have to devise specific training and career development schemes that integrate better the 
older workers in the global HRM strategy. On the one hand, from the viewpoint of human capital 
theory (Becker, 1964) aging of the workforce does not entail major risk for the organization in so 
far that higher compensation corresponds to higher contribution linked to the accumulation of 
competences, qualifications and workers’ experience. From the other hand, however, the concern 
of companies to maintain balanced workforce age breakdown and to ponder the benefit and cost of 
their strategy towards older workers is legitimate. 
The point is not that individual performance suddenly drops at the age of 60 but companies need 
to recruit young workers to remain dynamic and to control labor cost. The current mandatory 
retirement age of 60 is an efficient way to control both labor cost and intergenerational age balance 
(Debroux, 2016). The arguments given in case studies (Debroux, 2016) for not formally moving up 
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the mandatory retirement age of permanent employees to 65 are that it is not cost-wise feasible in 
view of the large number of older workers. Managing a significantly larger number of older workers 
can be done only with the prospect of legislative changes that would facilitate de-selection of 
permanent workers. Respondent companies want to keep enough flexibility through the use of non-
permanent status that is much less costly. They claim that it is almost impossible to imagine that 
they can offer working conditions traditionally bestowed to permanent employees to all of those 
wishing to stay in the organization after 60 years old (Debroux 2016). 
Moreover the dif ficulties to cope with the issue of skills and knowledge puts in question the 
applicability of Becker theor y in the case of old workers in a fast changing environment. 
Respondent companies understand the rational of keeping selected old workers and to invest 
in them in an aging society. But there are mixed overall opinions about older worker costs, 
technological competence, and flexibility. The ability to adapt to new work patterns often undermine 
efforts to get companies to recruit and retain older workers and limits the options for continued 
employment. In general terms it can be recognized that productivity decrease is observed in job 
tasks where problem solving, learning, and speed are important, requiring ‘fluid’ abilities, whereas 
for work tasks where experience and verbal abilities matter more that requires ‘crystallized’ 
abilities, less or no reduction in productivity occurs among elderly workers (Skirbekk, 2008). 
Respondent companies are globally appreciative regarding older workers’ loyalty, dependability, and 
judgment. However, they make rather negative assessments of attributes that could be considered 
‘fluid’ abilities such as technological competence (including but not limited to IT literacy) and 
functional flexibility, which are viewed as critical in today’s workforce and may be more important 
than the ‘crystallized’ abilities that workers have accumulated overtime. Therefore, despite 
initiatives to find new jobs inside the organization it is considered unavoidable that new types of 
careers (self-employment for example) outside of the organization must be developed at the same 
time. Respondent companies already devise support schemes serving to help older workers to find 
another job. They help them in negotiating with prospective employers, propose specific training 
programs or give days off to prospect the labor market.  But companies argue that higher public 
involvement in training schemes is a must to alleviate the burden (Debroux, 2016). 
Towards the emergence of an hybrid type of psychological contract
Nevertheless, despite the dif ficulties, a growing number of companies are moving up the 
mandatory retirement age to 65 with workers keeping permanent status of a kind. Analysis of the 
discourse of respondent companies that have lifted up mandatory age in a recent survey (Martine 
and Jaussaud, 2016) shows that they put their policy in a traditional long-term perspective.  In a 
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seller labor market due to shrinking population it can be considered part of a ‘talent strategy’. In 
order to remain an ‘employer of choice’ it could be an argument to reassure the prospects that their 
job will be safe until the time they are eligible to receive public pension and that career development 
can be projected more easily in the future. In so doing, companies could be able to have those 
workers remaining loyal to the company and dissuade them to move to another organization 
(Martine and Jaussaud, 2016). 
In another survey (Nabeta, 2016) of companies having lifted the mandatory retirement age, it 
is pointed out that the shift to higher mandatory retirement age generally goes with a system 
according to which part of the over 55 workers’ wage is deduced before retirement, so that decent 
reward can be bestowed after 60 years old in taking account of adjustment of the working patterns. 
Workers remain in the skill-grading system, meaning that they are still expected to learn. After 
60, they mostly work under so-called limited regular employment status according to different 
criteria (geographic mobility, working time, scope of duties). The status guarantees about 70% of 
the before 60 income, even without receiving any pension and, with some adjustment, gives right 
to fringe benefits. Much more thoroughly than before the psychological contract becomes more 
based on tangible, time and space bound explicit elements. Quantitative calculation (working 
time, internal mobility, scope of work, etc) is more important with working conditions negotiated 
according to specific criteria that lead to formal precise agreements (Nabeta, 2016). However, at the 
same time the maintenance of permanent status (even limited) after 60 indicates the continuation 
of the long-term commitment that started with the selection at recruitment stage. Workers are not 
de-selected as it used to be the case. They remain full member of the organization.  
It is plausible that policies of such nature will generalize for over 50 years old workers in many 
companies when they will move up mandatory retirement. It will go alongside changes for all 
segments of the workforce. Recent surveys show that majority of Japanese companies are still 
committed to long-term HRM policy for permanent workers (MHLW, 2015). One the one hand, 
adoption of performance driven appraisal and reward systems aims to increase productivity 
(motivation, sort out of fast track elites, emulation through internal competition) while reducing the 
total cost of labor. The skill-grading system is much more strictly linked to actual performance and 
training is more specific and focusing on measurable outcome, and the retirement allowance is now 
often based on points gained through assessment of individual performance and not only based on 
tenure as it used to be (Sueki, 2013). Growing monetary and non-monetary differential for workers 
of the same cohort appears in many companies. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the long-term 
commitment is exemplified by the continuation of recruitment based on new graduates, the still 
strong emphasis put on the skill-grading system, and the maintenance of the retirement allowance 
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itself (Sueki 2013). Companies still do not expect new recruits to have skills and working experience 
in recruiting processes and they continue to pay much attention to new graduates’ education (degree 
and school’ name value) (Nagano 2014). They are less involved in their employees’ personal and 
social life and traditional fringe benefits (welfare corporatism) are on the wane. But they still devote 
important resources to train the new recruits at the beginning of their careers and consider the 
employees’ socialization very seriously, all the more that the risk of premature leave of young 
employees is higher in a labor market that is bound to remain a seller market in many industries in 
view of the shrinking of the size of the young population. 
Nevertheless, for the time being companies acknowledge that they could end up with low 
productivity elderly ‘trapped’ workers if they do not manage well the transition imposed by aging of 
the workforce. This is all the more a plausible hypothesis because of the emphasis on acquisition of 
firm-specific skills that makes Japanese workers (especially older workers) much less mobile than 
those in other advanced economies. As a result, once unemployed, the chances for reemployment 
are not good and the duration of unemployment is long. In the longer perspective a smooth in-out 
flow of workers can be expected provided that companies are able to remain employers of choice 
in monetary and non-monetary terms. In the following years a growing pool of more specialized 
middle-age workers is likely to emerge in many companies as a result of the performance-driven 
system that goes alongside with the shift towards occupational-type of training. It means that 
companies can reasonably expect to keep at their disposal a pool of over 55 years old workers who 
can still be trained and given work commensurate to their capabilities. At the same time, if they are 
trained adequately specialized older workers will be more employable and with the emergence of 
larger external labor markets some of them can be expected to move to other organizations in good 
conditions, reducing the financial burden. 
It is traditionally assumed that Japanese workers would prefer to stay with their companies for 
a long time because the companies give them sustained access to new skills. However, a recent 
survey (Takahashi 2012) indicates that having firm-specific skills has a negative effect on being 
in a position of authority and income. If it reveals to be the case, it would significantly change the 
basis of the long-term social contract. Many Japanese companies have started to outsource training 
programs to specialized human resource companies. Therefore, workers perceive that they are 
developing general skills through such training. Economically, as long as companies offer them 
useful occupational training they may remain willing to stay. In the case of the older workers it may 
be the only solution to keep them in the organization in good condition until they retire. 
The shift towards occupational training is bound to accelerate the change in the selective basis of 
training, i.e., their content, objectives and the persons who should have access to the programs. As 
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a direct consequence, it could change the nature of the psychological contract because it would put 
in question the traditional view that Japanese workers identify themselves with their organizations 
rather than occupations (Sano, 2016). From a cultural perspective, a Japanese worker who changed 
his/her job was supposed to be stigmatized as a “betrayer” of his/her firm as a community. 
Moreover institutional cost of living employer prematurely (the amount of the retirement allowance, 
for example) and the fact that few companies were ready to offer work treatment commensurate to 
experience and capabilities to the recruited mid-career personnel meant that it was not common for 
them to receive a higher income after changing a job. However, with the emergence of an external 
labor market for many specialized occupations where the employees can expect to have higher 
income it seems that changing a job has becomes socially acceptable (Takahashi 2012). This has 
already started to change with the emergence of professional managers but also of researchers, 
engineers, architects, programmers, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals working as 
salaried person but it may become true for other categories of employees as well, including the 
older workers. The logic of the new model suggests that worker perception of the nature of the 
deals will impact on motivation and hence on the evolution of expectations. With acquisition of 
general skills those with marketable skills are more likely to prefer to de-select themselves and 
change employers as compared to the past. As Jackson (2013) claims the worker might ‘give 
up’ on a particular employer or supervisor, de-select or (mentally) quit, and redirect their career 
expectations elsewhere. In this way, actual or potential psychological contracts and relationships 
with other employers will take precedence; the original ‘psychological contract’ could become – in 
the individual worker’s expectation – overlayed by new contracts and relationships (Jackson, 2013).
Conclusion
So far the results of the surveys on older workers in Japan shows a large variety in practices and 
positioning.  In the balance found in companies that decided to continue to utilize over 60 years 
old workers as permanent employees (Martine and Jaussaud, 2016) it is pointed out there are 
elements that are linked to the willingness to control labor cost. However, at the same time efforts 
are observed that show the willingness to adapt to the workers’ expectations. For instance efforts 
are made to accommodate the factories and offices equipments and work patterns (timetable, 
work pace, collaboration with younger workers for physically hard tasks, etc) in taking into 
account physiological and psychological needs. Generally, those efforts require the expertise of 
experts in ergonomics, physicians specialized in work-related medicine, managers and specialist in 
gerontology (Martine and Jaussaud, 2016). In some companies policies are devised out of necessity 
but in others they seem to be more deliberate. 
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Although it is too early to draw conclusion, such examples might indicates the beginning of a 
gradual evolution toward a more dynamic mix of transactional and relational types of psychological 
contract in a growing number of companies. It would makes management of older workers more 
manageable until they retire at 65 and could trigger the launch of a life-cycle approach to labor force 
activity, in line with the projects of the public authorities. Eventually, it could mean that work and 
career would not be necessarily only based on chronological age. As result, it could increase the 
chances of prolonging employment by ensuring higher and more adaptable skills at work.
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